One of the things I understood becoming a German, was that if Russia ever decided to roll it's T55 fleet towards us, I'd have to get my family to safety and fight.
Interesting read! My view is that Putin wants a weak Europe, not a conquered Europe. If he can demilitarise Ukraine and the Balkan states, and fragment NATO, then I believe that is his strategic objective. He has already partly achieved those aims.
Secondly, where will the will for a war fighting Russian army come from? We already saw Putin empty the prisons of Russia, attempt general conscription and enlist Syrian and North Korean soldiers to the war. That has not been enough to overcome Ukraine. Will any salt of the earth Russian actually want to fight a war against NATO?
Very useful recap. And especially disturbing as we know that with 2% more GDP spend we would have paid for a chunk climate transition - someone should continue remind the world that. Also, in physical wars, defense has an advantage, especially with new technologies - cost efficiency should be sought there, if legacy thinkers are displaced (there’s a risk, given the aging of our workforce, including our military leaders). BTW, that’s not true with cyberwars, where offenders have an advantage.
But there’s something that I don’t feel you have brought up, and should. Let’s open the aperture. One doesn’t feel safer in a US street compared to a European one, despite the US investing much more in policing. One feels safer in places where the REASONS for conflicts are addressed (inequality being a big one). In that vein, it is worth re-reading Blattman’s Why We Fight, and addressing his 5 reasons. There’s multidimensionality there. Solutions always start with identifying the right problems to solve.
1. Unchecked rulers and interests: Leaders who benefit personally from war but do not bear its costs.
2. Intangible incentives: Motivations like vengeance, status, or ideology.
3. Uncertainty: Misjudging opponents’ intentions or capabilities.
4. Commitment problems: Fears that rivals will not honor future agreements, prompting preemptive strikes.
5. Misperceptions: Overconfidence or flawed beliefs about one’s strength or the enemy’s weakness
Assuming a successful invasion of Russia in the EU is there any analysis of what happens the day after? Is Russia capable of maintaining control of a territory beyond an invasion? What is the goal following a military victory? Say Russia takes over Germany - then what?
Putin plays a decadal game, that is one of destabilising neighbours for his own benefit. He doesn’t need to invade Germany to make Germany worse, less prosperous and party to his interests.
For now sovereignty reigns over efficiency. And it is likely it will remain that way for countries like the UK, France and Germany.
This isn’t necessarily a bad thing - to your point about strength. Some of that is real-world fighting power. The rest, political resolve.
As I see it there are 3 questions we are all now seeking to answer. Will Europe spend more? How much is ‘more’? And how quickly can that ‘more’ be found?
I’d also recommend War with Russia by former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Sir Richard Shirreff - less of a future history and more a thoughtful political fiction.
Without American help, the Europeans couldn't maintain a sustained counter offensive. No AWACS, limited inflight refuelling, limited satellite reconnaissance. Would systems like Patriot even work?
Another is that Europe has a lot of extremely well trained units, of all kinds, in large enough numbers, and with equipment much better that what the Russians have (in particular in the French and British armies).
Quite a few of these units have actual extensive experience on the ground (for ex, French legion troops spearheaded the effort in Irak, opening the way for the American troops).
On the Russian side: they fare really well against rebel forces in Syria, against civilians in Tchetchenia, against an undefended Crimea, but showed their very real limits in Ukraine.
Obviously, Europe will be in a much better position if it “wakes up” and start producing a lot more, but your statements regarding the supposed superiority of Russian troops vs European armies and equipment doesn’t make sense.
War isn't just about the fancy Rafales and Eurofighters. Much of European doctrine depends on American assets, for which no European replacements exist. For example, rapid repositioning of ground forces largely requires American heavy airlift.
Happy for you to point me to well-sourced and well-placed views that make your case.
It wouldn't be a prolonged Ukraine-like situation. Europe's air power is significantly better, and would crush Russia's attempted invasion of the Baltics within 2 weeks. After that, it is a very different war....
Profound, timely and real
One of the things I understood becoming a German, was that if Russia ever decided to roll it's T55 fleet towards us, I'd have to get my family to safety and fight.
Interesting read! My view is that Putin wants a weak Europe, not a conquered Europe. If he can demilitarise Ukraine and the Balkan states, and fragment NATO, then I believe that is his strategic objective. He has already partly achieved those aims.
Secondly, where will the will for a war fighting Russian army come from? We already saw Putin empty the prisons of Russia, attempt general conscription and enlist Syrian and North Korean soldiers to the war. That has not been enough to overcome Ukraine. Will any salt of the earth Russian actually want to fight a war against NATO?
They don’t get a choice. And they also live in an environment of near total information control, if you listen to interviews with captured soldiers.
You also have to understand cultural differences towards authority that still exist.
Very useful recap. And especially disturbing as we know that with 2% more GDP spend we would have paid for a chunk climate transition - someone should continue remind the world that. Also, in physical wars, defense has an advantage, especially with new technologies - cost efficiency should be sought there, if legacy thinkers are displaced (there’s a risk, given the aging of our workforce, including our military leaders). BTW, that’s not true with cyberwars, where offenders have an advantage.
But there’s something that I don’t feel you have brought up, and should. Let’s open the aperture. One doesn’t feel safer in a US street compared to a European one, despite the US investing much more in policing. One feels safer in places where the REASONS for conflicts are addressed (inequality being a big one). In that vein, it is worth re-reading Blattman’s Why We Fight, and addressing his 5 reasons. There’s multidimensionality there. Solutions always start with identifying the right problems to solve.
1. Unchecked rulers and interests: Leaders who benefit personally from war but do not bear its costs.
2. Intangible incentives: Motivations like vengeance, status, or ideology.
3. Uncertainty: Misjudging opponents’ intentions or capabilities.
4. Commitment problems: Fears that rivals will not honor future agreements, prompting preemptive strikes.
5. Misperceptions: Overconfidence or flawed beliefs about one’s strength or the enemy’s weakness
Assuming a successful invasion of Russia in the EU is there any analysis of what happens the day after? Is Russia capable of maintaining control of a territory beyond an invasion? What is the goal following a military victory? Say Russia takes over Germany - then what?
Putin plays a decadal game, that is one of destabilising neighbours for his own benefit. He doesn’t need to invade Germany to make Germany worse, less prosperous and party to his interests.
For now sovereignty reigns over efficiency. And it is likely it will remain that way for countries like the UK, France and Germany.
This isn’t necessarily a bad thing - to your point about strength. Some of that is real-world fighting power. The rest, political resolve.
As I see it there are 3 questions we are all now seeking to answer. Will Europe spend more? How much is ‘more’? And how quickly can that ‘more’ be found?
I’d also recommend War with Russia by former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Sir Richard Shirreff - less of a future history and more a thoughtful political fiction.
Well it will spend more, but probably not enough. I agree -- sovereignty will trump efficiency.
Interesting, and the conclusions needed, but it misses a couple of points - a fight against Europe is not like a fight against Ukraine:
* Europe's air power, even without US, would wipe out Russia's, and then anything on the ground is doomed.
* Russia would have to blackmail using nukes (tactical and strategic) and that will get everyone in a tizzy, US and China included.
* so: drones are not a panacea.
* and: The US was happy with Europe's dependence on it, until abruptly recently.
If Putin was smart, he'd offer to double Western Europeans' vacation time, and would walk in unhindered - haha ;P
Without American help, the Europeans couldn't maintain a sustained counter offensive. No AWACS, limited inflight refuelling, limited satellite reconnaissance. Would systems like Patriot even work?
That’s one point of view.
Another is that Europe has a lot of extremely well trained units, of all kinds, in large enough numbers, and with equipment much better that what the Russians have (in particular in the French and British armies).
Quite a few of these units have actual extensive experience on the ground (for ex, French legion troops spearheaded the effort in Irak, opening the way for the American troops).
On the Russian side: they fare really well against rebel forces in Syria, against civilians in Tchetchenia, against an undefended Crimea, but showed their very real limits in Ukraine.
Obviously, Europe will be in a much better position if it “wakes up” and start producing a lot more, but your statements regarding the supposed superiority of Russian troops vs European armies and equipment doesn’t make sense.
Thank you!
Maybe, but that isn't what the analysts say. Nor does it appear to be what the military themselves say. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/02/03/how-the-british-army-lost-its-way/
War isn't just about the fancy Rafales and Eurofighters. Much of European doctrine depends on American assets, for which no European replacements exist. For example, rapid repositioning of ground forces largely requires American heavy airlift.
Happy for you to point me to well-sourced and well-placed views that make your case.
It wouldn't be a prolonged Ukraine-like situation. Europe's air power is significantly better, and would crush Russia's attempted invasion of the Baltics within 2 weeks. After that, it is a very different war....
Ok. That isn't really what the Baltics believe.
I wouldn't play it overconfidently if I were them either...